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Abstract 
The study investigated the price and non-price factors that affect health care demand in 
rural Uganda using household data from Lira district in northern Uganda, which is the 
poorest region. The government had introduced the user-fee scheme as a strategy for 
supplementing government budgets to improve health care delivery systems. 
The results suggested that the demand for government heath care services was 
negatively and significantly influenced by the user-fees and drug unavailability. A 
simulation analysis suggested that an increase in medical charges (user-fees) leads to a 
fall in demand for government health facilities but increases the demand for both private 
health facilities and self-medication. Controlling for drugs availability, the demand for 
government health facilities falls when drugs are not available while demand for private 
health facilities rises. 
The policy implication is that government should be able to put resources from things 
like debt relief to stocking the drugs in public health facilities while the internally generated 
tax revenues could be utilized to provide free health services especially to the poor. In the 
long run, the policy option of a social health insurance scheme may be explored. 
1. Background and problem statement 
In a study of the determinants of regional poverty in Uganda (Okurut et al., 2002), the national food poverty line was computed to be US$68.6 per annum, far surpassing that of the Northern region's level of US$44.0, the lowest food poverty line in the 
country. The study also found that household size determines the level of poverty. Northern 
region recorded the highest mean of 5.27, followed by Eastern region (5.00), Western 
region (4.77) and Central region (4.60). The poor households in Northern Uganda had 
the highest mean household size of 5.92, compared with the poor in other regions. 
Manifestations of poverty in Uganda 
Low levels of education are closely linked to high poverty levels. The majority of households whose heads had no education were poor except for Central region, 
where only 47.0% of those without education were poor. A very high percentage (73.8%) 
of households in Northern Uganda whose heads had no education were poor. Furthermore, 
of Northern Uganda households whose heads had secondary education, 58.1% were 
poor compared with 25.9% in Central, 28.8% in Western and 42.7% in Eastern regions. 
More than three-quarters of the households in Northern Uganda stay in huts (78.1%), 
which accounts for 76.7% of the population of the region. The corresponding figures for 
Lira district are 72.5% and 71.1%, respectively (MFEP, 1995). 
Income variability has been a concern of many direct interventions against poverty. 
The poor are generally economically disadvantaged; they are mostly less educated and 
do not own capital and therefore may not easily engage in high-income generating 
activities. Poor households earn much less annual income compared with non-poor 
households, and poor households in the North earn the least of all the regions. 
One way of coming out of poverty is through remittances that supplement household 
incomes. The higher the remittances, the better off the recipient becomes. Here too, 
Northern region lags behind; findings indicate that poor households in Northern Uganda 
received the fewest remittances (Okurut et al., 2002). 
As a tropical country, Uganda experiences a high prevalence of tropical diseases 
such as malaria, with a disease pattern that is similar across the regions. Thus households 
inevitably have to spend on medical care. The health status of a household, therefore, 
depends on access to health services, which depends on factors like household income 
and education levels. In all these factors, Northern Uganda performs badly: The overall 
mean monthly household expenditure on health was Sh4,957, but the lowest expenditure 
1 
2 RESEARCH PAPER 1 5 5 
was in Northern region (Sh3,163). Regions with the highest mean income are also those 
that spend more on medical care. With a healthy labour force being necessary for 
productive activities that will lead to higher incomes, hence enabling the household to 
move out of poverty, the poverty situation may tend to be perpetuated in the North. 
As has been evidenced by a number of other scholars, poverty is more pronounced in 
rural areas because economic activities tend to be concentrated in urban areas. Northern 
region has a unique feature in that respect - whether one is in the urban or rural area, one 
is likely to be poor. This reflects the general level of poverty that is prevalent in Northern 
region. 
Health care policy reforms have been adopted as a strategy of supplementing 
government budgets in order to revitalize health care delivery systems. The strategy for 
decentralized health care delivery and financing has two critical components: user-fees 
and improved quality. 
Prior to the introduction of user-fees, government hospitals/health centres provided 
patients with consultations and, in theory, treatments free of charge. In reality, drug 
supplies were never consistent in the public sector owing to problems of budget cutbacks 
in the health sector and the diversion of drugs to private hands. Patients received the 
consultation, but in most cases only a prescription to purchase drugs at the private 
pharmacies, not the drugs themselves. 
The user-fee policy was intended to improve the quality of health care by making 
funds from the fees available to purchase drugs and pay incentives to staff. Fee revenues 
were also supposed to support other primary health care activities (e.g., community 
outreach), refresher training courses for staff and in some cases hospital renovations as 
in Jinja Hospital. Community health and management committees were to be established 
and trained to oversee these cost recovery activities. 
It is known that poor people do not have enough money to meet their medical bills. It 
has also been found (Okurut, et al., 2002) that poor households are generally larger than 
non-poor households, with the larger household size implying larger numbers of people 
who may fall sick. 
Rationale, objectives and relevance of the study 
Since the poor are argued to be the most vulnerable because they are more likely to fall ill (due to poor sanitary living conditions and lower intake of nutritious food) 
and to have the least means to obtain efficacious care, the study examines whether user-
fees are discouraging poorer households from obtaining access. 
Generally, Northern Ugandans are less educated than their compatriots in other regions. 
Results of the 1991 census reveal that the North had the highest proportion of those who 
never went to school (MFEP, 1995) and that it is in the North where the current enrolment 
in school is very low. Overall, Northern Uganda is the country's poorest region and has 
the lowest expenditure on health services and lowest proportion of surviving children 
(Okurut et al., 2002). This implies that besides the lack of education, earnings are low in 
the region because of a weak labour force, which is likely to perpetuate a vicious circle 
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of poverty. The problem here is: How can the situation be rectified so that they become 
healthy and able to produce more and thus come out of poverty? 
The study thus had two objectives: 
To analyse the factors affecting health care demand in Uganda. 
To derive policy implications for improving access to quality health care by the 
poor. 
The very high poverty levels in Northern region are reflected in the very low household 
expenditure on medical services. This means that with the current cost sharing. Northern 
region may not benefit much from the improved services that user-fee administration is 
expected to bring. This study has identified the relative importance of the different types 
of medical facilities. Government can use the findings to put in place policies that will 
cater for the poor and improve their accessibility to medical services. 
2. Literature review 
When the Bamako Initiative was launched in 1988, many African governments embarked on comprehensive primary health care programmes relying on revenues generated through user-fees to revitalize health care systems. These 
programmes emphasized two critical components: user-fees and improved quality (i.e., 
reliable drug supply). Evidence from Cameroon by Litvack and Bodart (1993) suggests 
that the user-fees plus quality policy lead to increased utilization of health care facilities. 
The travel and time costs involved in seeking alternative sources of care are high, and 
when good quality drugs are available at the local centre, the fee charged for care and 
treatment represents an effective reduction in the price of care and thus utilization rises. 
Evidence further suggests that poorer households benefit more than rich ones from the 
local availability of drugs. If user-fees are levied without a corresponding increase in 
quality of care, however, then this represents an effective increase in the price of health 
care, which affects the poor. Gertler et al. (1987) argued that the poor are more sensitive 
to price changes than the wealthy and that since user-fees increase the price of care, the 
poor respond by decreasing their consumption more than the rich. 
According to Litvack and Bodart (1993), in the absence of a user-fee and quality 
policy, local health centres were confronted with constant drug shortages and people had 
to incur substantial travel and time costs in addition to the high mark up on expensive 
brand name drugs used to fill prescriptions in the private drug store. The wealthier one 
is, the more able one is to afford these expenses and meet care needs. For a poor person 
whose time is spent on vital daily life saving activities (such as gathering wood, fetching 
water, preparing food and cultivating farmland - which may be small but vital for the 
family welfare), medical care can only be sought after the very basic necessities are met. 
The travel and time costs associated with seeking distant care serves as prohibitive barrier 
to the poorer people. The poor, who are unable to obtain care at the distant/expensive 
private pharmacy, tend to purchase drugs (usually partial dosages) from local drug dealers 
despite the common perception of poor quality. In some cases such local drugs may be 
potent, but others are merely cosmetic imitations of brand name drugs and contain no 
pharmacological value. Or they may be expired and potentially toxic. In such a scenario, 
the effective price of care for the poor is met at a price they are willing to pay through the 
user-fee plus quality policy. 
Litvack and Bodart (1993) further argue that from a public health perspective, increased 
utilization of the health facility under the user-fee plus quality policy is good because the 
people receive proper consultation and diagnosis prior to consuming drugs (unlike the 
local drug shops/pharmacies) and this improves the efficacy of care. In addition, by 
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increasing the use of curative care, population contact with the health facility rises, enabling 
greater delivery of cost-effective preventive and promotive care that will lead to decreased 
morbidity and mortality. Mwabu et al. (1993) argue that while the results of a natural 
experiment in Cameroon show that a combination of increased fees and improved quality 
result in a net increase and demand for government health care, with the greatest 
beneficiaries being the poor (Litvack and Bordart, 1993), the study results do not make it 
possible to disaggregate the size of the price and quality effects or specifically which 
components of quality might have an effect on demand. Further, it is unclear the extent 
to which the increase in demand arose from shifts among care alternatives, as opposed to 
generation of new demand for health care. 
Carrin (1988) argues that health status in sub-Saharan Africa is still a far cry from the 
goal of health for all, with average shares of public health expenditure in gross domestic 
product of only about 1%. There is general constraint on public sector budgets and the 
situation is exacerbated because health has to compete for resources with defence, 
education and housing. In an effort to lessen the restrictions on health development caused 
by limited public health budgets, Carrin (1988) suggested a number of alternative methods 
of health financing: health insurance; foreign aid; raising taxes; reallocation of public 
money or cost-recovery scheme (user-fee). He cautions, however, that although a cost-
recovery scheme can be operated nationally, the administrative costs may be excessive. 
Even at the local level there are appreciable costs associated with the collection of fees, 
accounting, the safeguarding and storing of revenues, and supervision. Local control of 
revenues may encourage health workers to collect fees and be more committed to the 
financing scheme, however, since they will expect to have a say in the allocation of the 
revenues. Furthermore, a community financing scheme may respond better to local 
preferences and encourage compliance with cost-recovery measures. 
Shortages of essential drugs may prevent the full potential of village health workers 
from being realized. People may be willing to participate in community financing schemes 
that are intended to achieve a satisfactory drug supply and enhance the efficiency of 
these workers. In addition, community financing of essential drugs may lead to broader 
involvement in the financing of health services if patients come to understand that there 
is a link between their monetary contributions and regular supplies of drugs. Carrin 
(1988) further argues that under the full cost-recovery policy, patients will be able to 
reach their optimum demand: they will pay for the drugs and enjoy an improvement in 
health. They will also realize that paying for and receiving all drugs needed is better than 
obtaining an inadequate amount of drugs free of charge (although this may not apply to 
the poor). 
The wider community may derive benefit from the consumption of drugs by patients. 
In malaria infested areas, for example, people gain from other people's use of anti-malarials 
if this reduces the prevalence of disease. According to economic theory, if people 
experience benefits from other people's consumption of drugs, the optimum demand for 
drugs from society's point of view is greater than the demand that would be forthcoming 
from individuals. This is because individual patients underestimate the social value of 
their own consumption. The benefits of changes in access and quality of health care 
services should be measured via their impact on the health outcomes of the population 
and not consumption of health care services per se (Capalbo and Heggem, 1999). 
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One caution is if prices are charged for drugs, the demand for them by poor people 
may fall and the health situation may deteriorate (Carrin, 1988). Concern about equity 
may dictate policies whereby the poor pay only a fraction of the cost price of the drugs 
they use, the subsidy coming from government. In combating important diseases, it may 
be socially desirable to provide drugs free of charge to the poor. A major difficulty 
resides in determining who should be given the right to free drugs. It should be the 
responsibility of the local authorities to devise such criteria given that they have the best 
information about people's socioeconomic status. Furthermore, equity considerations 
may justify setting fees according to socioeconomic status, the poorest patients paying 
less (or even receiving free of charge), which is certainly rational from the standpoint of 
social welfare. It is desirable that the community be involved in establishing the rules of 
a financing scheme, and when selecting a scheme consideration should be given to people's 
capacity and willingness to pay for the drugs and health care and to their notion of equity. 
Carrin (1988) also points out that the alternative health care financing could be health 
insurance schemes. The different forms of health insurance schemes include personal; 
family and compulsory. All are designed so that potential patients pool their risks and 
share in the financing of health care. The basic economic rationale for health insurance 
follows patients' aversion to risk. Risk-averse patients prefer to shift the risk to an 
insurance firm by paying a premium. But insurance contracts are difficult to draw up for 
two main reasons: For one, an insurer does not have all the information about an insured 
person's risk situation. This asymmetry of information is particularly marked when the 
insured's behaviour is characterized by moral hazard. That is, the insured's demand for 
health care is sensitive to the excessive demands for medical attention. If insurers do not 
make adequate allowances for such behaviour, premiums may be too small to cover 
treatment costs. Second is uncertainty of the probability of occurrence of adverse selection. In the absence of knowledge about the risks of illness in different populations groups, insurers may be compelled to charge a uniform premium that is likely to be higher than 
people in low-risk groups are willing to pay. This may lead to an upward movement of 
the premiums, making them unaffordable to many, including even the high-risk 
individuals. This explains why there is a general lack of a market for health insurance in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
To effectively administer a user-fee policy, Carrin (1988) suggests that a minimum 
knowledge of accounting and revenue management is required, along with the ability to 
cost the various inputs in the operation of a health centre and subsequently to set 
appropriate fees. 
Pangu and Lerberghe (1990) argue that while self-financing of identifiable elements 
of the system provides a link with development and participation, it is desirable to 
concentrate self-funding on the parts of the health system that depend least on technology, 
where people understand the choices made and where the results are clearly visible. 
Funding from outside the community, on the other hand, should go to the referral hospitals 
and other parts of the system where technical arguments have a greater bearing on decision 
making. 
A considerable literature has been written on estimation of the economic determinants 
of health care provider choices. One important point of consideration is the estimation of 
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the price elasticities of health care demand, particularly in the poorer regions of developing 
countries where there are varying arguments about appropriate levels of user-fees in 
government medical facilities (Dow, 1999). Accurate estimation of price elasticities is 
crucial in evaluating the trade-offs between health promotion and revenue generation in 
rural areas where poorly funded government health facilities are often the only choices 
for the people. Pangu and Lerberghe (1990) urged that health care prices (user-fees) be 
low enough to permit access and high enough for the health centre to function. Evidence 
suggested that each price increase was accompanied by a drop in the numbers attending, 
followed by an increase to a level lower than previously. 
Wamai (1992), in his study of Kasangati Health Centre cost recovery programme, 
observed that the demand for curative services was not significantly affected by the 
user-fee scheme and was independent of the general price index. A uniform user-fee was 
set for curative services irrespective of age, diagnosis or treatment but preventive health 
services were free. The overall patient load remained unchanged throughout the trial 
period, although the study rightfully admitted that they could have either been the same 
group of people using the services of the centre before charging user-fees started or 
alternatively there could have been a shift in the clientele. Wamai further pointed out that 
some people may have left the centre because they could not afford the user charges and 
instead opted for free services offered by the dispensary and primary health care workers. 
Other new users may have come in because of a number of possible reasons, for example 
because they: (a) appreciated the improved quality of service; (b) equated charging with 
better services and less corruption; (c) decided against private clinics or travelling to 
Kampala. It should be noted here that the serious limitation of the Wamai report was its 
inability to identify the economic status of the people who were using health services 
before the user fee policy; those who opted out; and those new users. In effect, the study 
does not inform on the effects of user fee policy on access to quality health care by poor 
households. 
Furthermore, evidence by Wamai suggests that staff absenteeism remained unaffected 
by the cash incentive from the user-fees. This suggests that other factors, apart from the 
cash incentive, could be significant in explaining the medical workers' attitude to work, 
these include supervision; administration; training or merely an obligation to work; and 
that the value of the cash incentive was too low to influence behaviour. It should be 
noted that one of the objectives of the user-fee policy was to improve staff morale by 
providing a supplement to the official salary from the user-fees collected whereby each 
worker got a monthly pay of approximately Shi ,000 depending on attendance. The 
monthly cash incentive may not have been high enough to entice staff away from pursuing 
alternative sources of income with which they "make ends meet". 
Wamai also observed that even though the indigent group (i.e., those unable to pay 
user-fees) had been guaranteed free treatment, they did not significantly change over 
time and did not pose any significant threat to centre income. It is argued that the indigent 
may have sought free treatment elsewhere or chosen to stay at home. This could have 
resulted from active discouragement of the indigent by the staff or self-decision by patients 
not wishing to be categorized as indigent. According to Wamai, the user-fee policy led to 
increased demand for all types of treatment consultations by patients, while health workers 
8 RESEARCH PAPER 1 5 5 
prescribed more drugs (especially oral antibiotics and injections) in an effort to give 
value for money to the patients. The effect was that the user-fee could not cover the cost 
of all the drugs supplied to the patients. In addition, the planned objective of using 
generated funds to purchase additional essential and non-kit drugs to supplement the 
Uganda Essential Drug Management Programme (UEDMP) kit so as to ensure 100% 
drug supply to the patients (without having to fill their prescriptions at private pharmacies) 
was not fully realized. The mitigating factors included: inadequate user-fee revenue; 
difficulty in procuring all essential drugs as some drugs are rare and patients for whom 
they are prescribed are few; and shift in the nature of clientele with more serious conditions. 
Mwabu et al. (1993) argue that the quality of medical care is a key factor in determining 
the success of health care financing reforms in Africa. A given improvement in service 
quality might increase demand for medical care by attracting new users or by increasing 
the intensity of service use by existing users. However, demand may fall if the improved 
service is more effective in dealing with patients' problems or with the underlying illness 
patterns. Although there is broad consensus among health care workers and policy makers 
about the importance of service quality in health care demand, improvements in service 
quality (e.g., staff redeployment or investment in facilities) have either not been undertaken 
or have been implemented without the necessary information about their impact on the 
demand for health care. 
3. Theoretical framework 
McNamara (1999) states that a travel cost model of hospital choice assumes that the travel effect is a weak complement to hospital services delivered at a particular location. Therefore, patients may visit facilities further away from 
their residential location, thus leaving the nearest options, in order to derive the desired 
satisfaction. The value of the facility's services delivered can thus be established by 
observing the decision of residents of a location to travel to alternative medical facilities. 
The a priori expectations on behavioural parameters are based on consumer theory 
and related health care demand studies. The demand effect of user-fee charges and distance 
(both of which are price variables) is expected to be negative. The quality of care 
(efficiency of treatment) has multiple attributes (Mwabu et al., 1993). The impact of 
improvement in medical care quality on demand is ambiguous. An improvement in medical 
care quality from the perspective of health practitioners will not have any effect on demand 
if patients do not perceive it as a quality improvement. On the other hand, if the 
improvement is perceived as efficacious (i.e., a benefit in treatment), it would increase 
demand. But to the extent that the improvement reduces population morbidity, its effect 
would be to reduce medical care demand in the long run. The observed demand effect of 
improved medical care quality is thus a net effect that depends on which of these two 
factors is dominant. Evidence by Denton et al. (1990) suggests a positive demand effect 
of availability of drugs in a health facility. As the drug variety increases in a health 
facility, it is expected that utilization of the health facility increases because people can 
expect to find medicines for their ailments. In the long run, however, availability of 
drugs may contribute to a reduction in morbidity in a community and hence reduce the 
demand for medical services for any given individual in the community because the 
individual is less likely to contract an illness. The coefficient for drug availability may 
therefore be positive or negative. The same applies to coefficients of other quality-related 
variables. 
The signs of the coefficients of the individual and household level variables may be 
ambiguous. For example the sign of income coefficients may be positive if health care 
services are perceived by households to be normal goods. If the households consider 
health services to be inferior goods, however, the income coefficients will be negative. 
The signs of coefficients on education and sex are also ambiguous a priori. A general 
education level will make the community more sensitive to seeking proper diagnosis and 
treatment from a qualified medical staff for any disease, hence having a positive demand 
effect for health care. On the other hand, at very high educational levels, the households 
will be able to practice good primary health preventive measures (such as boiling drinking 
water, maintaining good hygiene, eating a balanced diet), which effectively reduces the 
incidence of some diseases, hence the coefficient for education may be negative. 
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4. Methodology 
Since good health of household members is one of the critical components influencing the potential of households to increase production and hence move out of poverty, the study sought to investigate the demand for health care in 
Northern Uganda. Survey data were collected from 594 households sampled using a 
multi stage sampling technique. A variance and multinomial logit regression model was 
fitted in analysing the data. 
Data sources 
Three sets of questionnaires were used in this study. The household questionnaire was used to collect general information on household members, their age, sex, 
education, ethnicity, occupation, household income and expenditure as well sickness 
history of each member of the household and the health facilities utilized. The questions 
011 income and expenditure were based on the Integrated Household Survey conducted 
in 1992 by the Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development 
with the technical assistance of World Bank and UNDP under project UGA/91/R02. 
The health facility utilization questionnaire collected information on type of sicknesses, 
health facility visited and the cost incurred by households for health care. The third 
questionnaire collected information from health care providers on type of facilities they 
have, services they provide and charges levied for the services. 
Lira district comprises six counties: Dokolo, Erute, Kyoga, Lira Municipal, Moroto 
and Otuke. Three counties were selected with probability proportional to size with 
replacement. This was done by listing their 1991 census populations and adding up to 
make the county populations. Cumulative distribution was then obtained for each county. 
One subcounty was randomly selected from each of the selected counties again with 
probability proportional to size. Two parishes were randomly selected from each 
subcounty again with probability proportional to size with replacement. Three random 
numbers in the range ofO to 100 were generated from a computer. Using the cumulative 
distributions in the previous step, the random numbers were assigned to the county in 
which they fell. This process was repeated in the selection of the subcounties one from 
each county. Two parishes from each subcounty were selected again with probability 
proportional to size. The parishes in the selected subcounties were again listed in order 
in which they appeared in the 1991 census report and cumulated to make the subcounty 
populations. The cumulative percentage distribution was again obtained for each selected 
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subcounty. Six random numbers, in the range 0 to 100, two for each subcounty, were 
generated from a computer. Using the cumulative distributions obtained in the previous 
step, the random numbers were assigned to the parishes in which they fell. This resulted 
in six sampled parishes. 
The list of households in the selected parishes was obtained from Parish Chiefs or 
Local Council II chairs. This list was updated to eliminate households that had moved 
away and to include those that had moved into the areas as well as newly formed ones. 
One hundred households were selected from each parish using simple random sampling 
method without replacement. This gave a total o f600 households to which the household 
questionnaire was administered. From the information generated from household 
questionnaires, households whose members had been sick in the last one month or were 
currently sick at the time of the survey were selected for administration of the health 
facility utilization questionnaire. From the information obtained from the health facility 
utilization questionnaire, the health facility questionnaires were administered to the 
mentioned health providers in the district as well as in the neighbouring districts and 
those not mentioned but located within the district. The selected parishes are shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1: Sampled parishes 
County Subcounty Parishes 
Dokolo Dokolo Alwitmac 
Awiri 
Kyoga Aputi Agikdak 
Otira 
Lira Lira Central Baazar 
Senior Quarter 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The model 
According to Dow (1999), the own-price elasticity of demand for choice of a facility depends only on the probability of choosing the facility and the price level at the 
facility. In Uganda, however, price level is greatly influenced by taxes. Therefore, it is 
the anticipated satisfaction (among other things) that drives people to a certain medical 
facility. Health care demand depends on the price of that service, prices of alternative 
services, household income, time costs associated with using the services, and 
demographic characteristics of patients (e.g., sex, education, age), which can be specified 
as a utility maximization function (Gertler et al, 1987). A number of utility functions 
have been developed in the study of the demand for health care services (Gertler et al., 
1987; Doret al., 1987; Gertler and van der Gaag, 1990; Lavy and Quigley, 1993; Ellis 
and Mwabu, 1991; Mwabu et al., 1993; Mwabu, 1989; Ngugi, 1999; Creese, 1991). In 
the event of an illness, a patient is assumed to seek help from a health care system 
characterized by many providers. The patient (or a relative) is further assumed to choose 
the health care alternative that yields the maximum expected utility. 
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5. Empirical findings 
The analysis was based on self-reporting by households, which may have problems based on hypotheticals because people may not always do what they say they do. A total of 600 households were sampled and 594 of these were interviewed, 
giving a response rate of 99%. 
The demographic characteristics of the households 
Out of the interviewed households, 384 (64.6%) reported having at least one sick person in the four weeks prior to the survey. The total number of people in the 
surveyed households was 3,572. Of these, 50.1% were males and 49.9% were females. 
Table 2: Percentage distribution of household members by sex 
Sex N % 
Males 1,792 50.1 
Females 1,780 49.9 
Total 3,572 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Sex of household heads 
Of the sampled households, 87.9% were male headed and the other 12.1% were female 
headed. Out of the 517 male-headed households, 66.2% reported having at least one sick 
member within the last one month. For the female-headed households, 54.9% reported 
having at least one sick person. 
Table 3: Percentage distribution of households by sex of head by sickness status 
Sex 
At least one sick No sick person Total 
N % N % N % 
Males 342 66.2 175 33.8 517 87.9 
Females 39 54.9 32 45.1 71 12.1 
Total 381 64.8 2.7 35.2 588 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
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Educational level of household heads 
On average, the households that reported having at least one sick person had higher 
educational levels of the heads than the households that did not report any illness. Of the 
70 households whose heads never went to school, 62.9% reported having no sick person, 
while 37.1% reported having at least one sick person. 
Table 4: Percentage distribution of households by level of education of household head by 
sickness status 
At least one sick No sick person Total 
Educational level N % N % N % 
Never 26 37.1 44 62.9 70 11.9 
P1-4 35 56.5 27 43.5 62 10.6 
P5-7 125 62.8 74 37.2 199 34.0 
S1-2 23 71.9 9 28.1 32 5.5 
S3-4 61 70.9 25 29.1 86 14.7 
S5-6 28 87.5 4 12.5 32 5.5 
Tertiary certificate 44 80.0 11 20.0 55 9.4 
Tertiary diploma 24 72.7 9 27.3 33 5.6 
University degree 13 76.5 4 23.5 17 2.9 
Total 379 64.7 207 35.3 586 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The rate of reporting sickness tends to be higher with higher level of education of the 
household head as evidenced by at least 70% of the households whose heads had a 
minimum of secondary education. These results should not be interpreted to mean that 
the more educated households had higher rates of illness as compared with the less 
educated households, but rather that the level of awareness of the various symptoms of 
diseases is likely to be higher among the more educated people than the less educated. 
This implies that the less educated households may have more sickness prevalence but 
do not report because of lack of knowledge. 
Age of household heads 
The mean age of heads of the households that reported having a sick person within the 
last one month was 36.0, compared with 43.0 for those who reported having no sick 
person (Table 5). This suggests that households headed by elderly people are less likely 
to report sicknesses. The elderly heads may be less educated and this may explain why 
the degree of reporting sickness is low as they may not attach much value to medical 
attention. 
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Table 5: Mean age of household heads by sickness status 
Sickness status N Mean 
At least one sick 379 36.0 
No sickness reported 207 43.0 
Total 586 38.5 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The socioeconomic characteristics of households 
T h e mean total annual income for the sampled households was about 2 million shillings, 
with a mean expenditure of about 1 million shillings (Table 6). It is interesting to 
note that households that reported having at least one sick person in the one month prior 
to the survey had a higher mean income and expenditure and were headed by people 
with relatively higher educational levels, hence better income earning capacities. The 
difference in mean income between the households with at least one person sick and 
those without any sick person is significant at 2.6%. 
Table 6: Mean annual household income and expenditure by sickness status (in Uganda 
shillings) 
Sickness status N Mean income Mean expenditure 
At least one sick 384 2,338,341 1,163,967 
No sick person 210 1,469,531 812,479 
Total 594 2,031,186 1,039,704 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Mean annual household expenditure 
The proportion of household expenditure is lowest on medical care compared with other 
expenditure items like food, education and clothing (Table 7), but the differences are 
not significant for foods (p=0.0660). It can also be seen that the mean difference of 
medical expenditure is not significant (p=0.12). This may be explained by the general 
level of poverty in the study area, which means that preferences are on very basic needs. 
Table 7: Detailed mean household expenditure by sickness status 
Sickness status N Food School fees Clothing Taxes Medical 
At least one sick 384 53,436 233,612 129,465 31,425 22,233 
No sick person 210 41,481 132,060 99,193 24,789 16,971 
Total 594 49,210 197,710 118,792 29,079 20,373 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
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Mean household size 
The households that reported having at least one sick person had a higher mean household 
size: a mean of 6.05 compared with 5.94 for households that did not have any sick person 
(Table 8). This result suggests that it is mainly the larger households that tend to have 
sick people. In case of airborne diseases, the rate of infection in a large household is 
expected to be high given the poor ventilation in the majority of the houses. 
Table 8: Mean household size by sickness status 
Sickness status N Mean 
At least one sick 384 6.05 
No sick person 210 5.94 
Total 594 6.01 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Diseases and sources of treatment 
The common diseases identified were malaria, which was reported by 58.3% of respondents, cough and flu (13.2%), worms (5.9%), diarrhoea (3.9%), chicken pox 
(3.0%), and measles (2.5%). This is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9: Diseases suffered by the respondents 
Disease N % 
Malaria 346 58.3 
Cough/Flu 78 13.2 
Worms 35 5.9 
Diarrhoea 23 3.9 
Miscarriage 3 0.5 
Chest/Back pain 13 2.2 
Fracture 7 1.2 
Pneumonia 3 0.5 
Boil 6 1.0 
Appendicitis 2 0.3 
Skin disease 3 0.5 
Typhoid 4 0.7 
Syphilis 5 0.8 
Measles 15 2.5 
Chicken pox 18 3.0 
Cholera 1 0.2 
Ulcer 2 0.3 
Elephantiasis 4 0.7 
TB 1 0.2 
Mumps 1 0.2 
Tonsillitis 4 0.7 
Eye/Ear 5 0.8 
Liver, heart, kidney 4 0.7 
Dental problem 7 1.2 
Anaemia 1 0.2 
Goitre 2 0.3 
Total 593 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
1 8 RESEARCH PAPER 1 5 5 
Common diseases by age of patients 
The majority of the reported sick persons were infants and children aged less than ten 
years who were suffering mainly from malaria, diarrhoea, cough/flu and worms as the 
major diseases (Table 10). 
Table 10: Common diseases by age group of patients 
Age group 0 -4 5 -9 10-14 15+ Total 
Diseases N % N % N % N % 
Malaria 132 38.7 61 17.9 32 9.2 116 34.0 341 
Cough/flu 26 33.8 15 19.5 14 18.2 22 28.6 77 
Worms 10 28.6 4 11.4 2 5.7 19 54.3 35 
Diarrhoea 15 65.2 3 13.0 0 0.0 5 21.7 23 
Chest/back pain 1 7.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 92.3 13 
Measles 6 40.0 5 33.3 1 6.7 3 20.0 15 
Chicken pox 5 27.8 7 38.9 3 16.7 3 16.7 18 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Common diseases by sex of patients 
Analysis by gender of the people reported sick indicates that it was mainly females who 
were suffering from most of the common diseases: malaria (56.3%), cough/flu (54.5%), 
worms (68.6%), chest/back pain (53.8%) and chicken pox (55.6%). In the case of diarrhoea 
(52.2%) and measles (53.3%), the patients were mainly males. (See Table 11.) 
Table 11: Common diseases by sex of patients 
Males Females 
Common disease N % N % 
Malaria 149 43.7 192 56.3 
Cough/flu 35 45.5 42 54.5 
Worms 11 31.4 24 68.6 
Diarrhoea 12 52.2 11 47.8 
Chest/back pain 6 46.2 7 53.8 
Measles 8 53.3 7 46.7 
Chicken pox 8 44.4 10 55.6 
Source: Author from field survey data 
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Sources of treatment sought by patients 
Here we sought to know where patients went for the initial treatment for an episode of illness. Options were private clinics, government health centres, mission hospitals 
and pharmacies. Or they could opt for self-treatment. 
First source of treatment 
The majority of the patients (57.3%) had visited private clinics for their first treatment 
(Table 12). This was followed by government health centres (17.7%), mission hospitals 
(6.2%) and pharmacies (6.2%). Self-medication accounted for about 7.1%. 
These results would seem to confirm the observed phenomenon of the constant lack 
of drugs in the government facilities. Even after the introduction of user-fees in the 
government medical facilities, drugs are consistently inadequate and patients are therefore 
forced to purchase most of the prescribed drugs from private clinics and pharmacies. 
This effectively means that they are paying twice at the government facilities - for cost 
sharing and for drugs from private shops or clinics, plus the cost and inconvenience of 
travelling from one facility to another. 
Table 12: First source of first treatment 
Facility N % 
Government hospitals 32 5.4 
Government health centres 105 17.7 
Mission hospitals 37 6.2 
Pharmacy 37 6.2 
Private clinic 340 57.3 
Traditional healers 78 1.4 
Others 34 5.7 
Total 593 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Number of people reported sick and duration of sickness 
A total of 593 (16.6%) of the sampled household members were reported to be sick (or 
to have been sick), with the majority of the households (65.4%) reporting having had 
one sick person. In addition, 23.4% of the households had two sick people, while those 
households having three or more sick members accounted for 1 1.1% (Table 13). 
2 0 RESEARCH PAPER 1 5 5 
Table 13: The number of people reported sick per household 
Number of households 
Number of sick persons N % 
1 251 65.4 
2 90 23.4 
3 25 6.5 
4 9 2.3 
5 4 1.0 
6 4 1.0 
7 1 0.3 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The reported household members had been sick for less than one week prior to the 
survey (71.1%), followed by those who had been sick for 2 -3 weeks (21.4%). This is 
shown in Table 14. 
Table 14: Duration of sickness 
Duration N % 
Less than 1 week 422 71.1 
1-2 weeks 14 2.4 
2-3 weeks 127 21.4 
More than 3 weeks 30 5.1 
Total 593 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Mode of transport to first facility 
The commonest mode of transport to health facility was the bicycle (56.5%), followed by 
walking (32.7%) as shown in Table 15. Most of the patients either used self-owned or 
borrowed bicycle or walked, as the majority of them did not incur any transport cost. 
Table 15: Mode of transport 
N % 
None 9 1.5 
Motorized 51 8.6 
Bicycle 335 56.5 
Walking 194 32.7 
Others 4 0.7 
Total 593 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
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Availability of drugs 
Of the 584 patients who visited at least one health facility for first treatment, the majority 
went to a private clinic (58.0%), followed by government health centre/dispensary 
(17.8%). This is presented in Table 16. Of the 339 patients who visited the private clinic, 
93.5% reported that all the prescribed drugs were available. Those who visited government 
health facilities and reported that all the prescribed drugs were all available were 45.2% 
for government health centres and 66.3% for dispensaries. Over 91% of the sick who 
visited mission hospitals reported that all the drugs were available. This suggests that 
patients tend to visit a facility on the expectation of getting the drugs. 
Table 16: Percentage distribution of availability of drugs in a facility by the first source of 
treatment 
Yes No Total 
N % N % N % 
Government hospital 14 45.2 17 54.8 31 5.3 
Government health centre 69 66.3 35 33.7 104 17.8 
Mission hospital 34 91.9 3 8.1 37 6.3 
Pharmacy/drug shop 37 100.0 0 0.0 37 6.3 
Private clinic 317 93.5 22 6.5 339 58.0 
Traditional healer 4 57.1 3 42.9 7 1.2 
Other 28 96.6 1 3.4 29 5.0 
Total 503 86.1 81 13.9 584 99.9 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The second source of treatment 
Table 17 indicates that 86.4% of the patients visited only the first facility choice; they 
were probably cured and/or satisfied with the services rendered. Those who visited 
pharmacies as first facility choice did not visit any other facility. A very high proportion 
of the patients who visited private clinics (93.5%), mission hospitals (91.9%) and 
government health centres (67.3%) did not visit another facility. (The government health 
centres refer to dispensaries, sub-dispensaries and health centres that are located in the 
rural areas.) Of the patients who visited a second choice health facility, the majority 
ended up in private clinics (7.0%) and pharmacies (5.1%). The highest movement was 
away from government health facilities as first choice to private clinics or pharmacies as 
the second choice. The results suggest that the user-fees in government facilities are not 
contributing to the intended objective of improving health service delivery as evidenced 
by the continued movement from government health facilities to private clinics or 
pharmacies. 
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Table 17: Percentage distribution of patients who visited second source of treatment by 
first source of treatment 
Nowhere Govt hosp Pharmacy Private Traditional Others Total 
clinic healer 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Government hospital 15 46.9 1 3.1 8 25.0 6 18.8 0 0.0 2 6.3 32 
Government H/C 70 67.3 0 0.0 9 8.7 23 22.1 2 1.9 0 0.0 104 
Mission hospital 34 91.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 8.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 37 
Pharmacy/drug shop 37 100.0 37 
Private clinic 315 93.5 - - 12 3.6 8 2.4 1 0.3 1 0.3 337 
Traditional healer 4 57.1 - - 1 14.3 1 14.3 - - 1 14.3 7 
Others 33 97.1 - - - - - - - - 1 2.9 34 
Total 508 86.4 1 0.2 30 5.1 41 7.0 5 0.9 3 0.5 588 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Satisfaction with treatment 
T h e patients or their caregivers who reported having been satisfied were asked to 
specify the reasons for their satisfaction with treatment from the first source. The 
commonly cited reasons were availability of drugs (37.8%), low cost of services (26.0%) 
and improvement in health (11.5%). The private clinics ranked highest in terms of 
availability of drugs (39.4%) and full treatment obtained (5.9%). The pharmacies ranked 
highest as the cheapest source of treatment, followed by mission hospitals (37.8%). It is 
interesting to note that no patients reported having received full treatment from the 
government hospital. 
Whereas the private clinics and government health centres are reported to allow 
instalment payments for services, the government hospitals, pharmacies and mission 
hospitals do not have such provisions. In terms of improvement of health after the visit to 
the facilities, government health centres (18.1%) and private clinics (12.6%) ranked 
highest. Table 18 summarizes the responses on satisfaction with treatment. 
Table 18: Reasons for satisfaction by first source of treatment 
Available Full Cheap Good Improved Allows Total 
drugs treatment service health instalment who 
visited 
N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Government hospital 9 28.1 _ _ 9 28.1 2 6.3 1 3.1 _ _ 32 
Government health 
centre 34 32.4 4 3.8 18 17.1 2 1.9 19 18.1 2 1.9 105 
Mission hospital 14 37.8 1 2.7 14 37.8 2 5.4 2 5.4 - - 37 
Pharmacy 12 32.4 1 2.7 16 43.2 1 2.7 2 5.4 - - 37 
Private clinic 134 39.4 20 5.9 89 26.2 17 5.0 43 12.6 6 1.8 340 
Self-treatment 21 18.8 3 2.7 8 7.1 1 0.9 1 0.9 - - 112 
Total 224 37.8 29 4.9 154 26.0 25 4.2 68 11.5 8 1.3 593 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
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With regard to dissatisfaction related to the first source of treatment, government 
hospitals were mentioned with the highest frequency for insufficient treatment (18.8%) 
and government health centres for no improvement (19.0%). 
Table 19: Reasons for dissatisfaction by first source of treatment 
Expensive Waste Insufficient No Total 
of time treatment improvement who 
visited 
N % N % N % N % 
Government hospital _ 1 3.1 6 18.8 4 12.5 32 
Government health centre - - 1 1.0 6 5.7 20 19.0 105 
Mission hospital 1 2.7 - - - - 6 16.2 37 
Pharmacy - - - - 3 8.1 2 5.4 37 
Clinic - - - - 3 0.9 53 15.6 340 
Self treatment 1 0.9 - - - - 6 5.4 112 
Total 2 0.3 2 0.3 18 3.0 91 15.3 593 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Reasons for not visiting nearest health facilities 
Anearby facility is typically expected to serve households in the cluster in which it is located. The respondents were asked whether they visited the nearest health facilities. 
Table 20 shows that 10.6% of the households did not visit the nearest private clinic and 
about 15% did not visit the pharmacy or drug shop nearest to their homes. The least 
visited nearest health facilities were the health centres, dispensaries and sub-dispensaries 
(24.9%). Nearest hospitals were not visited by 22.6% of the households. 
Table 20: Percentage of households that never visited particular medical facility 
Facilities N %N=594 
Private clinic 63 10.6 
Pharmacy/drug shop 91 15.3 
Health centre/Dispensary/Sub-dispensary 148 24.9 
Hospital 134 22.6 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
In truth, there are only three hospitals in Lira district. Two of them, one government 
and the other mission, are both in Lira Town and the third is a private hospital in Kyoga 
county about I 50km south of Lira Town. There is also one mission hospital in Soroti 
district, which is in an adjacent county to one of the surveyed counties. The hospitals are 
so few that they cannot serve people for all illness episodes in the district. This might be 
one of the reasons why there were many people who did not visit hospitals. The 
respondents referred to them as nearest hospitals when they are actually far and there are 
other health facilities that are nearer. It is the health centres, dispensaries and sub-
dispensaries that are more accessible, but most of these are government owned and not 
visiting them may arise from the quality of services they offer. 
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The respondents from households whose members did not visit these facilities were 
asked to give reasons why they did not visit the facilities. The results are reported in 
Tables 21-24. Table 21 shows that 49.2% of the households reported they did not visit 
the nearest private clinic because of lack of money. Other common reasons were that it is 
not well equipped (14.3%), that it is distant (12.7%) and that the government hospital is 
preferred (11.1%). 
Table 21: Reasons for not visiting the nearest private clinic 
N=63 % 
No money 31 49.2 
Not well equipped 9 14.3 
Far 8 12.7 
Poor service 5 7.9 
Feared expired drugs 1 1.5 
Doctor rare 3 4.8 
Preferred government hospital 7 11.1 
New in the place 5 7.9 
Have personal doctor 2 3.2 
They are expensive 1 1.5 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
As in the case for private clinics, lack of money featured as the most frequently 
mentioned reason for not visiting the nearest pharmacy or drug shop (Table 22), but 11 % 
of the households cited lack of acquaintance with the nearest facility. Some respondents 
(8.8%) distrusted the nearest pharmacy/drug shop and thus would not visit them. 
Table 22: Reasons for not visiting the nearest pharmacy/drug shop 
N %N=91 
Drugs were already given 6 6.6 
No money 16 17.6 
Lack of acquaintance 10 11.0 
Distrust 8 8.8 
Prefer government hospital 5 5.5 
Not always present 2 2.2 
New in the place 5 5.5 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The majority of the health centres, dispensaries and sub-dispensaries in Lira district 
are run by government. Despite the introduction of the cost-sharing scheme that was 
intended to improve health care services by improving the availability of drugs and better 
medical equipment, government expenditures on medical services have continued to be 
budget constrained. One result is the reaction shown in Table 23, where 37.8% of the 
respondents indicated that they did not visit these facilities because they did not have 
sufficient drugs while 24.3% cited poor services by the government health centres/ 
dispensaries/sub-dispensaries. Moreover, poor households may not be in a position to 
meet the user-fee charges. Table 23 shows that 12.2% of the households reported that 
their members did not visit these facilities because of lack of money. About 12% doubted 
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the serv ices offered in these facilities. Some people had preference for private clinics 
only, probably because clinics are run by medical doctors. Distance was also cited as a 
reason for not visiting health centres/dispensaries/sub dispensaries (19.6%). This implies 
that clinics, pharmacies and drug shops are more distributed in the area and thus more 
easily accessible. 
Table 23: Reasons for not visiting the nearest health centre/dispensary/sub-dispensary 
N %N=140 
Not serious disease 7 4.7 
Poor service 36 24.3 
Do not have enough drugs 56 37.8 
No money 18 12.2 
Medical personnel rude 2 1.4 
Doubt of quality 18 12.2 
Not for civilians 5 3.4 
Have personal doctor 8 5.4 
Prefer clinic only 14 9.5 
Far 29 19.6 
My preference 1 0.7 
Close to other health facility 4 2.7 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The most frequently mentioned reasons for not visiting the nearest hospital are poor 
service (23.9%), distance (23.1%), high cost of treatment (22.4%) and lack of money 
(14.2%). This is presented in Table 24. Poor service in hospitals is likely to be referring 
to the government hospital as noted earlier. Patients' perception of the seriousness of the 
sickness also influences their decision to visit hospitals. 
Table 24: Reasons for not visiting the nearest hospital 
N %N=134 
Poor service 32 23.9 
Congested 8 6.0 
No money 17 14.2 
Doctors always absent 3 2.2 
Bureaucracy 3 2.2 
Prefer clinic 6 4.5 
Give underdose 3 2.2 
Not serious disease 23 17.2 
Same doctor who operates a nearby clinic 2 1.5 
They are not friendly 1 0.7 
Waste of time 5 3.7 
Far 31 23.1 
Corrupt 7 5.2 
Expensive 30 22.4 
Was not referred there 4 3.0 
Planning to go 1 0.7 
Prefer doctors in government hospital 1 0.7 
New hospital 5 3.7 
New in the place 4 3.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
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Facility characteristics 
Two government health fac i l i t ies-one hospital and one health cen t r e -were surveyed (Table 25). There were also two NGO/mission health facilities, one a hospital and 
the other a health centre. The majority of the surveyed health facilities were private, 
mostly clinics and drug shops as presented in Table 26. 
Table 25: Percentage distribution of facilities by ownership 
N % 
Government 2 13.3 
Private 11 73.3 
NGO/Mission 2 13.3 
Total 15 100.0 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
Table 26: Percentage distribution of facilities by type 
N % 
Hospital 2 13.3 
Health centre 2 13.3 
Clinic 6 37.5 
Pharmacy 1 6.7 
Drug shop 4 26.7 
Total 15 100.0 
Qr>i irro- Authnr from fiolH cnrvoy Ha ts» 
The medical superintendents or administrators were asked to indicate the common 
diseases they treat; the analysis of the responses is presented in Table 27, which shows 
that malaria (73.3%) and respiratory infections (80.0%) were rated as very common. 
Other diseases also rated as common were diarrhoea (40.0%), intestinal worms (40.0%), 
sexually transmitted diseases (33.3%) and pelvic inflammatory disease (PID; 33.3%). 
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Table 27: Common diseases reported by health facilities 
N % 
Malaria 11 73.3 
Respiratory infection 12 80.0 
Diarrhoea 6 40.0 
Intestinal worms 6 40.0 
STDs 5 33.3 
Musculoskeletal diseases 4 26.7 
Pelvic inflammatory disease 5 33.3 
Measles 3 20.0 
Wounds 3 20.0 
Typhoid 2 13.3 
Skin diseases 2 13.3 
Injuries 2 13.3 
Ulcers 2 13.3 
Dental cases 2 13.3 
Surgical cases 1 6.7 
Ear diseases 1 6.7 
Mental cases 1 6.7 
Conjunctivitis 1 6.7 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
T h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e f ac i l i t i e s w e r e a l so a s k e d to g i v e t h e a m o u n t o f m o n e y t h e y 
c h a r g e f o r t r e a t i n g t h o s e d i s e a s e s . T a b l e 2 8 g i v e s the a v e r a g e c h a r g e fo r s o m e s e l e c t e d 
d i s e a s e s . T h e t a b l e s h o w s tha t fo r b o t h c h i l d r e n a n d adu l t s , t he p r i v a t e f ac i l i t i e s c h a r g e 
m u c h h i g h e r r a t e s t h a n t h e N G O / m i s s i o n h e a l t h fac i l i t i e s . 
Table 28: Medical charges (in Uganda shillings) for some selected diseases 
Children Adult 
Private NGO/Mission Private NGO/Mission 
Malaria 2,543 600 3,476 1,250 
Respiratory infection 2,257 875 2,833 2,500 
Diarrhoea 2,250 200 - -
Worms 3,333 - 3,250 -
Genito-urinary diseases 8,167 1,500 - -
Wounds - - 3,000 -
STDs 6,000 2,400 7,000 6,000 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
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Determinants of health facility selection 
It is known that in a given period of illness, patients or their relatives make health care decisions in stages (Mwabu, 1986). The first stage is awareness of the illness. At this 
stage, the patient or a relative must decide whether to seek treatment for an illness. If the 
decision is to seek medical care, then the next decision is on the choice of source of 
treatment. The outcome of the choice at this point is a visit to a particular health facility. 
In this study, three different choices of sources of treatment are investigated. They are 
government, pay facilities and self-medication. The pay facility includes mission health 
facilities, private clinics and drug shops. 
Structural adjustment programmes implemented in Uganda brought cost sharing in 
some of the social sectors that for a long time had been the obligation of government to 
supply. These are sectors like education and medical. Consultation and treatment in public 
health facilities had been free, but these facilities often lacked drugs because of budget 
constraints. This made mission and private sources more popular. Now government has 
introduced user-fees, which are expected to be used to purchase drugs and pay top-up 
allowances for medical workers. For the poor, who may not be able to pay the fees, the 
decision may be to opt for self-medication. 
The model was fitted with poverty status as one of the independent variables. The 
computation of the poverty status was based on the reasoning that 43.6% of the people in 
Northern Uganda are poor (Okurut et al., 2002). Using cumulative distribution of the 
households, the households whose income fell on the 43.6 percentage point mark or 
above were recorded as poor and the rest as non-poor. This means that the income level 
of the 43.6 percentage point in the cumulative distribution position is regarded as the 
poverty line. 
A multinomial model was built on poverty status, who decided to go to that facility, 
logarithms of charge for drugs and income, and whether the drugs were available. 
The models are of the form 
Comparing the choice between government facility and self-medication, the cases 
decided by persons other than the head, spouse or parent were likely to opt for self-
medication (Table 29). The head was 4.9 times likely to decide to take the patient to 
government health facilities than opt for self-medication, while the parent was 2.0 times 
likely to opt for government facility rather than self-treatment. The spouse was 5.9 times 
likely to take patients to a government health facility. Poor households were more likely 
(V) 
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to give patients self-treatment (B = -1.7899), but non poor households were likely to take 
their patients to a government health facility. The poor were just 0.2 times likely to visit 
a government health facility than the non poor. The model shows that as household 
income increases, there is a tendency to shift away from government health facilities (B 
= -0.2086). In a related model with government as the comparison group, the households 
with higher income tended to shift from government to private facilities. By implication, 
as income increases, the ultimate preference is the private facility. This explains the 
negative coefficient given in Table 29. 
Table 29: Parameter estimates for choice of medical facilities 
Government Private 
Variables B P Exp(B) B P Exp(B) 
Constant 11.3533 0.002 2.3509 0.443 
Poverty status 
Poor -1.7899 0.021 0.2 -1.1128 0.081 0.3 
Non poor 0.0000 1.0 0.0000 1.0 
Head 1.5990 0.152 4.9 1.7155 0.050 5.6 
Spouse 1.7696 0.038 5.9 0.3603 0.575 1.4 
Parent 0.6767 0.376 2.0 0.2991 0.586 1.3 
Other 0.0000 1.0 0.0000 1.0 
Log charge -0.8290 0.000 0.4 -0.2468 0.090 0.8 
Log income -0.2086 0.343 0.8 0.1542 0.388 1.2 
Drug availability 
Yes -1.5885 0.014 0.2 0.3054 0.610 1.4 
No 0.0000 0.0000 1.0 
Source: Author from field survey data 
With a higher charge on medicine, patients were likely to shift from visiting a 
government facility to self-treatment (B=-0.8290). This has multiple implications for 
both the cost sharing objectives in public facilities and wider disease control issues. 
Even since the implementation of cost sharing, government has not been able to stock its 
medical facilities with all necessary drugs. The charges are likely to scare away poor 
people who are not able to afford the fee. As the increase in medical charges leads to a 
shift from government to self-medication, the money expected to be generated through 
cost sharing cannot be realized, hence further reducing the government 's ability to stock 
the necessary drugs in those health facilities. 
Self-medication may also bring other public health problems. When people themselves 
decide which drugs to buy, they most probably will be guided by the amount of money 
they have regardless of the correct dosage and prescription. The wrong self-prescription 
may lead to non-effective treatment of the disease, while the under dosage increases the 
disease resistance to the drugs thus increasing the risk of fatal attacks on the poor. Malaria 
is a good case in point. Self-treatment may also mean opting for local medicine. The 
self-treatment option by the poor is thus not likely to enhance disease control. 
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Table 30: Probability distribution of determinant of facility choice 
Government Private Self-medication 
Model 0.0998 0.8126 0.0876 
Non poor 0.0449 0.7193 0.2358 
Head decided 0.0969 0.8860 0.0172 
Spouse decided 0.3186 0.6337 0.0476 
Parent decided 0.1423 0.7942 0.0634 
No drugs 0.0168 0.9109 0.0723 
Source: Author from field survey data. 
The demand for a government facility for a patient from a non poor household falls 
by 55.0% compared with a poor household. The demand for such a person for a pay 
facility falls by 11.5%, but demand for self-medication rises by 169.3% (self-medication 
included those who bought drugs from the market). 
When the head decides where to take the patient, the probability of a private facility 
rises by 9.0%. The demand for a government facility falls by 3.0% and self-medication 
by 80.4%. When this decision is made by the spouse, demand for government facility 
rises by 219.2%, while demand for private facility falls by 22.0% and self-medication by 
45.6%. If a parent makes the decision, the demand for government facility rises by 42.6% 
but the demand for private facility and self-medication fall by 2.3% and 27.5%, 
respectively. 
When medical charges increase by 11.7%, other things remaining constant, demand 
for government facility falls by 5.9% but demand for private facility rises by 0.4% and 
self-medication by 3.2%. 
Table 31: Percentage change in choice of medical facilities 
Government Private Self-medication 
Poor to non poor -55.0 -11.5 169.3 
Another person to head -3.0 9.0 -80.4 
Another person to spouse 219.2 -22.0 -45.6 
Another person to parent 42.6 -2.3 -27.5 
Medical charge1 -5.9 0.4 3.2 
Household income2 -1.1 0.2 -0.4 
Drugs available to no drugs -83.1 12.1 -17.4 
1 With 11.7% increase in drug prices. 
2 With 3.4% increase in household income. 
Source: Author from field survey data 
But if income increases by 3.4% the probability of choosing a government facility 
falls by l . l % and that of self-medication by 0.4%, while demand for private facility 
increases by 0.2%. Controlling for drug availability, the demand for government facility 
falls by 83.1% when drugs are not available and by 17.4% for self-medication. In the 
same circumstances the choice of private facility rises by 12.1%. 
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Table 32 presents the income and price elasticities of demand for various medical 
services. The results suggest that the demand for medical services is income inelastic. 
However, the income elasticity of demand is higher for government facilities and self-
treatment than for private facilities. As for medical charges, when the charge for medicine 
increases, most people would move away from government to private facilities and self-
medication: An 11.7% increase in the price of drugs would reduce the probability of 
visiting a government health facility by 5.9%. The same change in cost of drugs would 
increase the probability of visiting a private clinic by 0.4% and it would increase the 
probability of opting for self-medication by 3.2%. 
Table 32. The income and price elasticities of demand for medical services 
Facility Income elasticity of demand Price elasticity of demand 
Government 0.32 0.50 
Private 0.06 0.03 
Self-medication 0.12 0.27 
The price elasticity of demand for medical services is also generally inelastic, but it is 
higher for government facility followed by self-treatment. The inelastic price elasticity 
of demand for private facility may be explained by the high likelihood of drug availability. 
Because there are usually no drugs in the government facilities, changes in prices of 
drugs in private facilities is unlikely to shift demand from private to government facilities. 
The lower price elasticity of demand for private health facilities (especially private 
clinics) may also be accounted for by the distance to government hospitals. A spatial 
analysis of the distribution of health facilities suggests that private clinics are located 
closer to the surveyed households as compared with government hospitals, hence an 
increase in the prices charged in private clinics leads to a small reduction in demand 
when distance to other facilities is taken into account. 
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6. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
Conclusions 
Most of the sampled households went to private clinics as the first source of treatment. 
The second choice was government health facilities. The highest satisfaction derived 
by patients from visiting a facility was the availability of the prescribed drugs. It is in fact 
the likely availability of drugs that is the major motivation for the choice of a particular 
health facility. Because government facilities were the least stocked with all the drugs, 
the highest movement was from government health facilities as first source of treatment 
to private clinics or pharmacies as second choice. 
Households with more educated heads were more likely to report sicknesses, and the 
most commonly reported diseases by patients or their relatives and the health care providers 
were malaria and respiratory infections. Most reported sicknesses had a duration of less 
than one week. This shows high levels of awareness of the various illnesses among the 
population, which can be attributed to the many primary health care programmes run by 
Ministry of Health through the print and electronic media. 
NGO/mission health facilities generally charge lower fees than private facilities. The 
price elasticity of demand for medical care is inelastic although the elasticity is higher 
for government and self-treatment options. Medical care demand is also income inelastic. 
Despite the lack of drugs in the government health facilities, the people, especially the 
poor, still visit them in anticipation of getting free treatment. Some people also visit them 
just for the sake of getting a prescription and then go to buy the drugs elsewhere. 
Households with relatively higher income visited private health facilities as they had a 
means to pay for the services. In cases where there were prolonged periods of sickness, 
the people tended to shift from modern to herbal medicine, possibly because of loss of 
trust in modern medicine. 
Policy Recommendations 
The results suggest that there is a general awareness of various diseases among the households, attributable to the primary health care programme campaigns. It is 
recommended that more resources should be allocated to the primary health care 
programmes to sustain and further increase levels of public awareness. 
The results also show that the poor tend to shift from a government health facility to 
self-medication options because of their inability to pay for cost sharing. This may have 
the implication of aggravated fatal attacks among the population and increased drug 
resistance for diseases such as malaria. It is therefore recommended that government put 
in place a mechanism to provide affordable medical services for the poor. 
The price elasticity of demand for government medical services is higher compared 
with other sources. The implication here is that setting cost sharing fees too high will 
force even the non poor to opt for other sources of treatment. It is thus recommended that 
the user-fees should be set taking into account the price elasticity of demand for the 
services. 
The study reveals that the government health facilities were the least stocked with 
necessary drugs. It is recommended that government increase the budgetary allocations 
to the health sector so as to ensure the availability of the necessary services. Government 
should also put in place strict accountability systems for the drugs to avoid their being 
siphoned from government facilities to private facilities. 
An alternative policy option would be to set up a social health insurance scheme so as 
to enhance access to medical services. Given that the availability of drugs in the private 
health facilities is the main motivation for visiting them despite their higher prices, a 
social health insurance scheme would be a plausible option. 
It is observed that the people working in government health facilities are very often 
the same people running private clinics, basically as a survival strategy. It is recommended 
that the salary structure of government health workers be reviewed so as to give them a 
living wage. 
34 
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